Insurance and the Myth of the Hard Market

The hard market is the stuff of legend as far as I’m concerned. To me, it appears to be a cyclical and arbitrary theory promulgated by the insurance company to justify the need for increased premiums to fuel shortfalls caused by free market conditions and certain disasters that adversely affect the insurance industry.

But that’s just me.


First, let me say that there may have been a time that the theory of a hard or soft market may have been justified. I’ve only been in the business since 1986, but the research on the issue is a little sketchy.

From what I have gathered, soft markets, in which insurance premiums drop and the market is more advantageous to the buyer, generally lasted two to five years and would follow the cyclical trends of the economy.

By 2001, we were almost nine years into a soft market, and there were no real signs that it was going to turn anytime soon. By the insurance industry’s estimation, we were at least four years overdue for the market to harden, which would have led to significant and, in my opinion, arbitrary price increases, and all I heard from the industry professionals was this:

“Be prepared. The market is starting to harden. These low rates can’t last for long.”

And so it went.

Then there were the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Now, there is no doubt that this was a catastrophic event, the likes of which have never been seen on American soil. But from an insurance standpoint, and particularly from a property casualty standpoint, this was not a catastrophe that should have ushered in the hard market in the insurance industry that came about immediately after these events—especially in the property casualty market.

Much of the loss of life was covered through life insurance. As of this writing, the property claim at the World Trade Center has yet to be resolved, although a federal jury has categorized the event as two occurrences, meaning that the ownership group could collect the limits twice because the policy was written on an occurrence basis.
The losses that ensued from business interruption and loss of revenue coverage were well funded prior to this loss, and therefore should have been a non-factor. I firmly believe that the insurance industry took this event and used it as an excuse to arbitrarily “harden” the market. The losses were well funded, and although the fallout from 9/11 did result in the bankruptcy of some insurance carriers, these companies can find no fault beyond their own parking lots because of their internal reserve and surplus policies before the event.

Now that the industry has had the opportunity to review the economic fallout from these attacks, these appear to be a consensus of understanding:

 Total economic loss due to the attacks was around $38 billion.
 Insurance losses amounted to roughly 50 percent of that total ($19.1 billion).
 The property damage to the World Trade Center alone was approximately $7 billion of the total
 Much of the losses were covered by life insurance, which would not significantly affect the property casualty side of insurance.

Thus, you are looking at property casualty losses, independent of the WTC loss, which was absorbed by one group of insurers and reinsurers, of less less than $10 billion. In contrast to this, the economic effects of Hurricane Katrina are estimated to be in excess of $50 billion. Hurricanes Ivan and Charley in the summer of 2004 have estimated losses of $19 billion. Yet, neither of these events seem to have had the impact on the insurance markets that the 9/11 attacks did.

I believe there was a watershed decision made in 1999 that should have put the debate of the hard market to rest. In that year, Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act. This act allowed, for the first time, banks to offer insurance products and for insurers to offer banking services through holding companies. This created a synergy between the two industries which allowed both to tap into their customer bases and mine business from the other industry. Banks and insurance companies could offer their clients a one-stop alternative for both insurance and banking.

The result was an increase in competition in the marketplace, which led to consolidation of companies that were too weak to compete in the more dynamic market. The increased competition increased supply for a fairly stable demand, reducing the prices in the marketplace. The increased competition also caused some weaker insurers to lower their qualifications for coverage, which weakened their overall book of business and made them susceptible to the vagaries of the free market. At the same time, it provided a need for coverage in the secondary market that was not being fulfilled at a reasonable price.

These market conditions were becoming evident prior to 2001 and fell back into line fairly quickly after 2001. From an indemnity standpoint, the 9/11 attacks should have been a nonevent but for the insurance industry’s need to have an excuse to raise premiums and rid themselves of some bad risks they were forced to take due to the increased competition from FSMA.

Now be forewarned. I'm told the market is going to start to harden later this year.